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PUBLIC FINANCE AND WAR IN ANCIENT GREECE 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Before the Persian Wars the Greeks did not rely on public finance to fight each 
other. Their hoplites armed and fed themselves. But in the confrontation with Persia this 
private funding of war proved to be inadequate. The liberation of the Greek states 
beyond the Balkans required the destruction of Persia’s sea power. In 478 Athens agreed 
to lead an alliance to do just this. Already it had Greece’s largest fleet. But each 
campaign of this ongoing war would need tens of thousands of sailors and go for 
months. No single Greek city-state could pay for such campaigns. The alliance thus 
agreed to adopt the Persian method for funding war: its members would pay annually a 
fixed amount of tribute. This enabled Athens to force Persia out of the Dardanelles and 
Ionia. But the Athenians also realised that their military power depended on tribute and 
so tightened their control of its payers. In so doing they turned the alliance into an 
empire. By 450 Athens had become a threat to Greece’s other dominant power. But 
Sparta struggled to counter it effectively. In the Peloponnesian War Sparta realised that 
it could only do so if it too became a sea power. But its weak public finances ruled this 
out. All changed in 412, when Persia’s Great King decided to give it the necessary 
funds. In exchange for the right to levy tribute again on Ionia’s Greeks he helped the 
Spartans to acquire a large fleet. In 405 this fleet destroyed the last warships of Athens. 
Sparta could now dismantle its empire and force it to surrender by a land and sea 
blockade. 
 In the Corinthian War Persia initially funded the anti-Spartan alliance, as the 
Spartans had decided to fight it for control of Ionia’s Greek city-states. The Athenians 
used its gold to rebuild their fleet. With these warships they set out to re-establish the 
Athenian empire. But this represented a still bigger threat to Persia. Consequently it 
switched its funding to the Spartans. They quickly assembled a fleet in the Dardanelles 
where they stopped the grain ships sailing for Athens. The Athenians feared being 
starved into submission once again and so accepted the King’s Peace. This treaty of 386 
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scuttled their attempt to re-establish their empire. To keep waging wars they now had to 
develop different funding-sources. In this Athens was reasonably successful. It was thus 
able to keep Sparta at bay and quickly became a major regional power. But it was not 
successful enough to stop the rise of Philip. By 338 this king had defeated Greece’s 
other regional powers and so made Macedonia its hegemon. This success rested largely 
on his public-finance reforms. His son became less concerned about public finance as he 
conquered Persia; for plunder easily paid for his army. But the hellenistic kingdoms 
which arose after him managed their public finances carefully. With vastly larger tax-
bases they fielded armies several times larger than those of classical Athens or Sparta. 
War for dominance among the Greeks had now moved well beyond their city-states.  
 
2. The Persian Wars 
 
 Archaic Greeks did not depend on public finance for war. They fought wars 
infrequently and usually only over contested land between poleis (‘city-states’).1 
Typically wars were initiated not by the state’s rudimentary political institutions but by 
elite individuals in a private capacity.2 These leaders raised volunteers by promising 
them a share of the booty and the land which might be won in battle.3 The hoplites who 
volunteered usually only numbered in the hundreds.4 They came along with their own 
armour, weapons and food-supplies. They too were drawn mainly from the elite.5 
Archaic wars went for days or weeks and were settled by a solitary battle. Because of 
the winning side’s lack of military capacity, they generally did not result in the 
subjugation, occupation or taxation of the other side’s polis.6 In the archaic period war 
was thus a predominantly private activity whose participants financed it themselves. 
Even after the sixth century Greek poleis which did not aspire to be major or dominant 
                                                 
1
 D. M. Pritchard, ‘The Symbiosis between Democracy and War: The Case of Ancient of Ancient 
Athens’, in D. M. Pritchard (ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2010), 
7-15.  
2
 E.g. Hdt. 6.34-7; see also F. J. Frost, ‘The Athenian Military before Cleisthenes’, Historia 33 
(1984), 283-94.  
3
 E.g. Plut. Vit. Sol. 9. 
4
 E.g. Thuc. 6.56-8.  
5
 H. W. Singor, ‘The Military Side of the Peisistratean Tyranny’, in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 
(ed.), Peisistratos and the Tyranny: A Reappraisal of the Evidence (2000), 107, 110.  
6
 The exception is the archaic Spartans who enslaved the Messenians and turned themselves into 
full-time hoplites in order to maintain their enslavement; see e.g. P. Cartledge, Spartan Reflections 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2001), 299-307.  
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military powers, such as Athens, Sparta and Thebes, persisted with this small-scale 
fighting on land.7  
 War changed in two big ways in the classical period. Both can be seen most clearly 
in the polis (‘city-state’) of Athens. In the fifth century this state quickly became one of 
Greece’s dominant military powers. Athens was largely responsible for making the wars 
of the Greeks reliant on public finance. The first change was that war became a fully 
public activity. In Athens this was a result of the democratic reforms which the elite 
leader, Cleisthenes, sponsored after 508.8 These reforms gave the Athenian dēmos 
(‘people’) sole responsibility for initiating wars and a new public army of hoplites for 
waging them.9 The second change was naval warfare. Persia forced the Greeks to get 
serious about fighting at sea. The Athenians knew that the Ionian Revolt of 499 to 494 
had been lost because of Persia’s superior fleet. They knew too that the triremes of the 
Persians had gotten them to Marathon in 490. Persia financed its navy through a unique 
feature of its empire: it required each of its subject state to pay an annual tax which was 
based on an assessment of what it could afford.10 There was no parallel for this financing 
of war in archaic Greece. Persia’s Great King, Darius I, introduced this system of phoros 
(‘tribute’) in 518.11  
 To get ready for Persia’s next attempt to subjugate them the Athenian dēmos 
decided, in 483, to expand massively their public navy.12 As it cost about 1 talent, that is, 
26 kilograms of silver, to build a trireme,13 they could only afford this expansion 
because of the unexpectedly high income which they had recently earned from their 
local silver-mines.14 The 200 triremes which they had at the end of this shipbuilding was 
the largest polis-owned fleet yet seen. So that there were enough captains for this fleet 
                                                 
7
 W. R. Connor, ‘Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression’, Past and Present 119 
(1988), 6-8.  
8
 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 20-1; Hdt. 5.66-73.  
9
 Hdt. 5.96-7; see also Pritchard (n. 1), 15-16.  
10
 K. A. Raaflaub, ‘Learning from the Enemy: Athenian and Persian ‘Instruments of Empire’’, in 
J. Ma, N. Papazarakadas and R. Parker (eds.), Interpreting the Athenian Empire (London, 2009), 98-9. .  
11
 Hdt. 3.89-97.  
12
 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.7; Hdt. 6.87-93, 7.144; Thuc. 1.14.  
13
 E.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.7; IG ii2 1628.339-68; see also D. M. Pritchard, ‘Costing Festivals and 
War: The Spending Priorities of the Athenian Democracy’, Historia 61 (2012), 51.  
14
 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.7; Hdt. 7.144; see also G. Davis, ‘Mining Money in Late Archaic Athens’, 
Historia 63 (2014), 257-77.  
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the Athenian dēmos created the liturgy of the trierarchy.15 This public service required 
an elite citizen to command a trireme for one year and to pay for its running-costs over 
and above the misthos (‘pay’) of its crew. A trierarchy cost about 1 talent.16 The 
payment of trireme-crews was the responsibility of the state. Their misthos was a logical 
necessity: because the trireme lacked the space for the stowing of food-supplies, its crew 
had to purchase food each day from local markets or private houses.17 In addition there 
was no guarantee that sailors would remain with their ships if they were not paid. 
Athenian trierarchs usually hired their sailors from those volunteering their services in 
the Piraeus, the port of Athens, or in other ports along the way.18 Because volunteers 
faced no sanction against desertion and could find employers elsewhere, they could, and 
sometimes did, desert if they were not paid.19  
 
3. The Athenian Empire 
 
 Athens therefore had to pay its sailors. But doing so proved to be hugely 
expensive.20 A sailor was normally paid 1 drachma per day.21 This was the same as the 
misthos of a skilled labourer or a hoplite.22 There were 200 sailors on a trireme and so it 
cost 6000 drachmas, that is, 1 talent per month to keep it at sea.23 This meant that Athens 
had to spend hundreds of talents to send out even a fraction of its fleet for the regular 
sailing-season of 8 months. In the Persian War of 480 to 479 the Athenians resorted to 
emergency-measures to pay for their fleet.24 But in order to keep on using it they had to 
find an adequate source of public finance. This they did in 478 when Ionia’s Greeks 
                                                 
15
 V. Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations (Baltimore 
and London, 1994), 19-104.  
16
 E.g. Dem. 21.155; 21.80; Lys. 19.29, 42; 21.2; see also Pritchard (n. 13), 28.  
17
 E.g. [Dem.] 50.22, 53-5; see Pritchard (n. 13) 47-8.  
18
 E.g. [Dem.] 507-8, 12-13, 18-19; see also L. A. Burckhardt,. ‘Söldner und Bürger als Soldaten 
für Athen’, in W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im. 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Vollendung oder 
Verfall einer Verfassungsform?: Akten eines Symposiums 3.-7. August 1992, Bellagio (Stuttgart: 1995), 
125.  
19
 E.g. [Dem.] 50.11-12, 14-16, 25, 36.  
20
 V. Gabrielsen, ‘Die Kosten der athenischen Flotte in klassischer Zeit’, in F. Burrer and H. 
Müller (eds.), Kriegskosten und Kriegsfinanzierung in der Antike (Darmstadt, 2008), 46-73.  
21
 E.g. Thucydides 3.14; 6.8, 31; 7.27.  
22
 W. T. Loomis, Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens (Ann Arbor, 1998), 32-
61, 97-120.  
23
 E.g. Thuc. 6.8.  
24
 E.g. Plut. Vit. Them. 10. 
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invited them to lead the ongoing war against Persia.25 The multilateral alliance which 
Athens subsequently established is known as the Delian League.26 So that it could 
finance their naval operations league-members adopted the Persian method for funding 
war: most league-members promised to pay an agreed amount of phoros each year. In 
most cases what each polis paid was the same as the annual tax which it had paid 
Persia.27 These tribute-payments added up to 460 talents per annum.28  
 For its first decades the Delian League campaigned nonstop to expel Persians from 
harbours across the Aegean Sea, to destroy Persia’s fleet and to liberate Ionia’s poleis.29 
At the same time Athens started to undermine the independence of league-members, 
who, by 450, were subject to laws of the Athenian dēmos and had long been forcefully 
prevented from seceding from what was now the Athenian Empire.30 Imperial income 
allowed Athens to employ thousands of elite and nonelite Athenians as sailors and 
hoplites.31 It could now run campaigns which lasted months or, in the case of sieges, up 
to a few years With phoros the Athenians could wage war more frequently than ever 
before and pioneer new forms of warfare on land and at sea. Athens became, for 
example, the Greek world’s leading sea power and leading besieger of cities.32 Now it 
was widely recognised that war relied on public finance.33 Athenian politicians argued 
that their state’s dunamis (‘military power’) depended on warships, fortifications and 
especially money.34 Pericles even argued that Athens would win the Peloponnesian War 
of 431 to 404, because its public finances were so much stronger than Sparta’s.35  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Thuc. 1.94-7.  
26
 P. J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World (Malden, Melbourne and Oxford, 2006), 
14-21.  
27
 L. Kallet, ‘The Origins of the Athenian Economic Arche’, JHS 133 (2013), 56; Raaflaub (n. 
10), 100-1.  
28
 Thuc. 1.96, 99; see also D. J. Phillips, ‘Thucydides 1.99: Tribute and Revolts in the Athenian 
Empire’, ASCS 31 [2010] Proceedings, available at http://www.classics.uwa.edu/ascs31.  
29
 Thuc. 1.97-8.  
30
 R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1972), 152-74; Rhodes (n. 26), 20-1, 41-51.  
31
 Pritchard (n. 1), 17-21.  
32
 For its unsurpassed skill as a besieger, see e.g. Thuc. 1.102.  
33
 D. M. Pritchard, ‘‘The Fractured Imaginary’: Popular Thinking on Military Matters in Fifth-
Century Athens’, AH 28 (1998), 55.  
34
 See e.g. Andoc. 3; Ar. Ach. 162-3; Av. 378-80; Ran. 365; Lys. 170-6, 421-3, 488, 496; Plut. 
112; Dem. 4.40; 8.48; 9.40, 70-2; 13.10; 22.12-17; Lys. 13.46-8; 28.15.  
35
 E.g. Thuc. 1.142-3; 2.13, 65.  
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4. The Peloponnesian War 
 
 In spite of this financial strength Athens still found the Peloponnesian War 
ruinously expensive. Its first 10 years were called the Archidamian War. On it the 
Athenian dēmos spent on average 1500 talents per year.36 This was 15 times more than 
what they spent on state religion and 10 times more than on running their democracy.37 
Because it also exceeded their state’s annual income of 1000 talents,38 the dēmos had to 
find extra funds urgently. In 428 the eisphora which they levied raised the 
unprecedented sum of 200 talents.39 The eisphora was an intermittent tax on the elite’s 
property to pay for a war.40 In 425 the Athenians trebled the phoros of their imperial 
subjects to 1200 talents.41 Despite these public-finance measures, by 421, when Athens 
won the Archidamian War, it had exhausted its cash-reserves of 6000 talents.42  
 The Peace of Nicias of 421 to 416 saw these cash-reserves quickly restored.43 
Sparta had long been Greece’s dominant land power, because its hoplites, as full-time 
professionals, fought much better than its enemies and it could force its allies to provide 
further hoplites for its wars without the need to pay them. But the enormous army which 
Sparta could raise proved ineffective against Athens; for whenever, in the course of the 
Peloponnesian War, it entered Athenian territory, the Athenians simply withdrew within 
their fortifications, imported food-supplies by sea and waited for their enemies to 
leave.44 Now Sparta realised that they could only defeat Athens if they became a major 
sea power.45 But to become one it too had to find a way to meet a fleet’s astronomical 
costs. Sparta found a way in 412, after the destruction of the enormous expedition which 
Athens had sent to conquer Sicily. Persia saw this destruction as the best opportunity in 
                                                 
36
 Pritchard (n. 13), 39-44.  
37
 For the cost of state religion, see Pritchard (n. 13), 23-39. For the cost of democracy, see D. M. 
Pritchard, Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens (Austin, 2015).  
38
 Xen. An. 7.1.27. 
39
 Thuc. 3.19; see also L. J. Samons, Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance (Stuttgart, 
2000), 205.  
40
 V. Gabrielsen, ‘Finance and Taxes’, in H. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Greek 
Government (Chichester, 2013), 342.  
41
 Andoc. 3.8-9; Ar. Vesp. 656-60; Plut. Vit. Arist. 24; IG i3 71.61-181; see also Pritchard (n. 13), 
41-2.  
42
 Thuc. 2.13; IG i3 369. 
43
 Aeschin. 2.175; Andoc. 3.8-9; Thuc. 6.26; see also Pritchard (n. 13), 44-5; Samons (n. 39), 
166-7.  
44
 E.g. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.16; see also Pritchard (n. 1), 20-1.  
45
 Thuc. 8.2-5.  
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decades to get rid of the Athenian Empire. In exchange for re-gaining the right to levy 
phoros on Ionia’s Greeks it thus provided Sparta with enough gold to build and to 
maintain a fleet.46 In the course of the Ionian War, which is the name of the 
Peloponnesian War’s last phase, this Spartan fleet came in time to surpass what was left 
of the Athenian fleet.47 In 405 Sparta easily destroyed the last of the Athenian triremes 
in the Dardanelles and so was able to force the surrender of Athens by a land and sea 
blockade.48 With its full control of the Aegean Sea it subjugated the last of the poleis 
which supported Athens and so brought the Athenian Empire to an end.  
4. The Corinthian War 
 
 In Greece’s next 10-year war Persia’s financial support was again decisive. The 
Corinthian War, which started in 395, got its name from the battles which were fought 
about Corinth. This war pitted Sparta against three of its former allies, Argos, Corinth 
and Thebes, who were now allied with Athens. Initially the Great King, Artaxerxes II, 
funded this anti-Spartan alliance,49 because the Spartans had abandoned the treaty which 
they had struck with him during the Ionian War.50 Instead of letting him levy phoros on 
Ionia’s Greeks the Spartans were now fighting him for control of them. Athens used 
Persia’s gold to rebuild its fortifications and its fleet.51 With these triremes it attempted 
to re-establish the Athenian Empire.52 Athens was now forcing Greek poleis in Ionia and 
the Dardanelles to be its subjects again.53 On them Athens re-imposed the 5 per cent tax 
on their maritime trade,54 which it had first introduced in 413.55 It also re-imposed 
another public-finance measure which dated back to the Ionian War: the 10 per cent tax 
on merchant ships through the Dardanelles.56  
                                                 
46
 Thuc. 8.18, 37, 58.  
47
 Rhodes (n. 26), 142-54.  
48
 Xen. Hell. 2.1.27-2.9.  
49
 E.g. Xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2; 4.8.9-11.  
50
 R. Seager, ‘The Corinthian War’, in D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. 
Ostwald (eds.), The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume VI: The Fourth Century BC (Cambridge, 
1994), 100-6. 
51
 Xen. Hell. 4.8.9-10.  
52
 Seager (n. 48), 113-17.  
53
 E.g. Xen. Hell. 4.8.27-30.  
54
 E.g. IG ii2 24.  
55
 Thuc. 7.28.  
56
 Dem. 20.60.  
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 These Athenian actions were manifestly at Persia’s expense. By the early 380s 
Athens was even backing revolts against the Persian Empire in Cyprus and Egypt.57 
Artaxerxes II thus realised that by helping Athens to fight Sparta he was fighting fire 
with fire. The Athenians were now a bigger threat to his empire than the Spartans would 
be. Therefore the Great King agreed to support Sparta financially as long as he got 
complete control of Ionia’s Greeks.58 With Persia’s financial support the Spartans 
assembled and manned quickly 80 warships and sailed to the Dardanelles where they 
stopped the grain ships sailing to Athens.59 This action brought the Corinthian War to a 
speedy end. The Athenian dēmos feared being starved into submission as they had in 
405. Consequently when Persia summoned to Sardis all those who wished to hear the 
general peace-treaty which its king wanted, the ambassadors of Sparta and the anti-
Spartan alliance arrived with flattering speed.60  
 
5. The Second Athenian League 
 
 The King’s Peace of 386 scuttled the attempt of Athens to rebuild its empire. 
Ionia’s poleis, which had been this empire’s largest group, were again, after a century, 
Persian subjects.61 The peace-treaty also stipulated that the other Greek poleis must be 
autonomous. This meant that the Athenian dēmos could no longer force other states into 
dependent international relations. Against any polis which broke these terms Artaxerxes 
promised that he ‘would make war both by land and sea, and with ships and with 
money’. Worse still he let Sparta use the autonomy clause as an excuse to attack other 
poleis or to ignore it altogether.62 In the face of this resurgent Sparta Athens had to find 
new allies as a matter of urgency. It took the Athenian dēmos several years to work out 
just how to do this: they would invite other states to join a multilateral alliance which 
respected the King’s Peace.63 This alliance is known as the Second Athenian League. 
Athens promised league-members that it would not interfere in their politics nor make 
                                                 
57
 Ar. Plut. 178; Xen. Hell. 4.8.24; 5.1.10.  
58
 Xen. Hell. 5.1.25.  
59
 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28.  
60
 Xen. Hell. 5.1.30.  
61
 Xen. Hell. 5.1.31.  
62
  E.g. Diod. Sic. 15.5.3-5; Xen. Hell. 5.2-3; see also Rhodes (n. 26), 212-13.  
63
 Diod. Sic. 15.28-9; see also J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981).  
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them pay phoros.64 By 378 the Athenians judged that this league was sufficiently large 
to resume full-scale war against Sparta.   
 In the fifth century Athens had largely paid for its armed forces out of imperial 
income. But the King’s Peace now ruled this funding source out. In order to fund this 
new war the Athenian dēmos thus needed to reform public finances. In 378 they changed 
how the tax for war on elite-property was collected.65 Eisphora-payers no longer paid 
individually. Instead they placed into groups and the wealthiest three members of each 
paid for the whole group before collecting the tax from its other members.66 This reform 
helped to ensure that funds for an expedition were always on hand for its departure. For 
the same end the dēmos had, by 373, established a dedicated fund to pay for war.67 
Before 350 any surplus of public income at the year’s end was deposited into this 
stratiōtika or military fund.68 In 373, finally, Athens started asking league-members to 
make suntaxeis (‘contributions’) to their joint expeditions.69 During the Athenian Empire 
the Athenians alone had complete control over the amount of phoros to be collected and 
how it was to be spent.70 These suntaxeis were quite different. The Second Athenian 
League had an independent council of its members.71 This council authorised the 
contribution-amount which each polis paid and how the collected suntaxeis could be 
spent.72 These contributions added up to around 60 talents per year.73   
 In the 370s and the 360s Athens spent on average 500 t. per year on its armed 
forces.74 In spite of its public-finance reforms this was often a struggle. Athenian 
generals were regularly sent out with insufficient funds and so had to raise more funds 
                                                 
64
 IG ii2 43.15-45; see also P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 
BC (Oxford,  2003), 92-113.  
65
 M. R. Christ, ‘The Evolution of the Eisphora in Classical Athens’, CQ 57 (2007), 53-69.  
66
 E.g. Dem. 2.24, 30; 22.44; [Dem.] 50.8; Isaeus 6.60.  
67
 RO 26.53-5; see also P. J. Rhodes, ‘The Organisation of Athenian Public Finance’, G&R 40 
(2013), 219.  
68
 Dem. 1.19-20; 3.11-13.  
69
 E.g. Dem. 18.234; [Dem.] 49.49; IG ii2 43.23; see also P. Brun, Eisphora – Syntaxis – 
Stratiotika: Recherches sur les finances militaires d’Athènes au IVe siècle av. J.-C. (Besançon and 
Paris, 1983), 91-3.  
70
 E.g. IG i3 71. 
71
 Rhodes (n. 26), 232-3.  
72
 E.g. IG ii2 233; see also Rhodes and Osborne (n. 62), 358-61.  
73
 E.g. Aeschin. 2.71; Dem. 18.234.  
74
 Pritchard (n. 13), 45-57.  
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during their campaigns.75 They met such shortfalls by, for example, drawing on the 
booty which they had captured, plundering the enemy’s countryside, or forcing poleis 
outside of the league and merchant ships to pay protection money.76 Importantly, 
however, they could not treat such funds as their own private property as the 
imperatores (‘commanders’) of the Roman Republic would come to do.77 Money so 
raised was judged to be public property.78 The dēmos authorised its collection and usage 
either before a general departed or during his campaign.79 On his return he had to submit 
an account of what he had raised in the field and to hand over any surplus to the state.80 
In the fourth century Athenian generals were widely recognised for their expertise in 
raising such funds on campaign.81  
 
7. The Rise of the Hellenistic Kingdoms  
 
 These different funding-sources enabled the Athenians to become a major military 
power.82 They could thus continue fighting Sparta successfully until the Thebans ended 
its hegemony of Greece at the battle of Leuctra in 371. For the next three decades the 
Athenians were able to keep enemies well away from their territory and to the launch the 
fleets which were required to protect their shipping-lines through the Dardanelles, which 
were vital for their grain-supply.83 It was once again recognised as Greece’s leading sea 
                                                 
75
 V. Gabrielsen, ‘Warfare and the State’, in P. Sabin, H. van Wees and M. Whitby (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare: Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the 
Rise of Rome (Cambridge, 2007), 264-72.  
76
 For this use of booty, see e.g. Diod. Sic. 15.47.7; Nep. Timoth. 1; Xen. Hell. 6.2.36; for 
plunder, see e.g. Isoc. 15.111-12; Polyaenus Strat. 3.10.0; for protection money, see e.g. Aeschin. 2.71-
2; Dem. 8.24-6.  
77
 D. Hamel, Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period (Boston, Cologne and 
Leiden, 1998), 158 pace C. Taylor, ‘Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations and 
Slander’, G&R 48 (2001), 61.  
78
 E.g. Dem. 24.11-14; Lys. 28.1-4, 6, 10; 29.2, 5, 8-11, 14; Xen. Hell. 1.2.4-5.  
79
 Dem. 8.9; 21.3; Diod. Sic. 16.57.2-3; Lys. 28.5-6; see also Burckhardt (n. 18), 115, 130; P. 
Millett, ‘Finance and Resources: Public, Private and Personal’, in A. Erskine (ed.), A Companion to 
Ancient History (Chichester, 2009), 475.  
80
 Dem. 20.17-80; Lys. 28.6; see also P. Fröhlich, ‘Remarques sur la reddition des comptes des 
stratèges athéniens’, Dike 3 (2000), 81-111.   
81
 E.g. [Arist.] Oec. 1350b-1a, 1353a; Polyaenus Strat. 3.11.5; see also J. K. Davies, ‘Athenian 
Fiscal Expertise and Its Influence’. MediterrAnt 7 (2004), 491-512. 
82
 Pritchard (n. 1), 51-5.  
83
 For this protection of Attica see e.g. P. Harding, ‘Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth 
Century’, Phoenix 42 (1988), 68-71. For the shipping-lines, see e.g. Dem. 18.301-2; [Dem.] 50; Xen. 
Hell. 5.4.61.  
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power.84 Yet in spite of this renewed military success public finances were not strong 
enough to stop the rise of Philip II. In only twenty years this king turned Macedonia into 
a major military power and then, with his victory at the battle of Chaeronea in 338, into 
Greece’s new hegemon.85  
 Certainly this rise had a lot to do with Philip II’s military innovations. He 
introduced an unrivalled training-program for the Macedonian army.86 He employed vast 
numbers of non-Macedonian hoplites, horsemen and peltasts as mercenaries.87 By 
investing in siege-engines Philip II came to surpass Athens as a besieger of cities.88 But 
what made this military pioneering possible was his careful building up of Macedonia’s 
public finances.89 Phillip II fully exploited the mineral resources of his expanding state.90 
When he captured, for example, Mount Pangaeum in 356, he massively expanded its 
gold-mines.91 This mining alone earned him 1000 talents per year. As this king 
incorporated new territories into Macedonia he also broadened its tax-base by requiring 
their elites to pay eisphorai on their private property.92  
 His son, Alexander the Great, by contrast, grew less concerned about public 
finances as he conquered the Persian Empire; for plunder, he found, easily paid for his 
army.93 Initially the diadochoi (‘successors’), who, after Alexander III’s death in 323, 
fought over his conquests, found the same. But in time they too had to manage carefully 
their public finances.94 The Ptolemies thus introduced a 10 per cent tax on Egyptian 
agriculture. In Ionia and beyond the Seleucids maintained the phoros of the Persians, 
while the Antigonids built on what Philip II had done in Macedonia. Such public-finance 
reforms enabled the hellenistic kingdoms to raise significantly the scale of Greek 
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warfare.95 At the battle of Gaza, for example, in 217, the armies of Antiochus III and 
Ptolemy IV, which were mainly composed of mercenaries, totalled 140,000.96 This was 
several times more than the armies which Athens and Sparta had ever put into field 
against each other. War for dominance in the ancient Greek world had now moved 
decisively beyond its poleis.  
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